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Abstract 
 
It is widely believed that empowering women via various material means increases women’s outside 
options and, thereby, makes them less vulnerable to intimate partner violence. However, the effect of 
such empowerment on domestic violence could be subtle particularly in countries with pre-existing 
high tolerance to violence, weak law enforcement and male institutional domination. Using cross-
sectional household-level survey data for Latin American countries, we test the effect of property 
ownership by women on domestic violence. The results show that a woman’s sole property ownership 
is not associated with less domestic violence against her; sometimes the correlation is even positive. 
However, married women who co-own the property are less likely to face domestic abuse by husbands. 
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1. Introduction 
The recent highly publicized cases in the United States brought the issue of abuse against women to the 
forefront of public discourse nationally and globally.1 These cases remind us that all sorts of 
mistreatments of women fall under the global public policy domain that concerns both developing and 
developed countries. Domestic violence is a particularly serious problem in Latin America and the 
Caribbean countries, where male institutional domination, the culture of machismo, sexism and 
misogyny are quite common (Sara-Lafosse 2013; Colbert 2019; Grossbard 2020). The region has one 
of the highest rates of violence against women (United Nations Development Programme 2017). 
 This paper examines the impact of property ownership by women on domestic violence using 
a representative household-level data drawn from different waves of the Demographic and Health 
Surveys for four Latin American countries – Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Haiti and Honduras. The 
results show that joint house ownership of a married woman is negatively associated with the likelihood 
of psychological and physical violence against her. The impact of joint land ownership, however, is not 
robust for the full sample. The disaggregated results show that the findings are driven by a subsample 
of rural residents; the property ownership appears to be a more important factor in reducing domestic 
violence in rural areas. Further, for the rural subsample, joint land ownership is also a statistically 
significant and negative correlate of domestic violence. Interestingly, the violence-mitigating effect of 
joint house ownership holds for married couples only, and not for those living in a partnership relation. 
We find no evidence to suggest that single property ownership by women reduces domestic violence. 
We conjecture that policymakers in developing countries should prioritize on implementing cultural, 
institutional, educational and legal reforms to end abuse and coercion that women in these countries 
have been facing. Empowering women via material means might not be sufficient to promote stable, 
violence-free marriages and unions. 
 We include scores of variables to mitigate omitted variables bias. A number of proxies for 
partner’s quality is also added to alleviate the selection issue associated with wealthy women, who have 
more property assets, choosing less abusive partners. However, domestic violence may influence the 
property allocation decisions within household, raising the reverse causality issue. DHS data does not 
have information on the timing of assets acquisition to address this issue. Therefore, we cannot establish 
the causal relationship and our results should be interpreted keeping this in mind. Despite the limitation, 
our study significantly contributes to the literature. First, the endogeneity problem is not unique to our 
paper and, in contrast to many extant studies, our data set is large with detailed partner information that 
makes our results informative. Our finding that the sign and the significance of the relationship between 
woman’s ownership of property and domestic abuse depends on the type of property is of great 
importance. Second, our study differentiates between the effect of various types of ownership on 
                                                 
1 The sexual abuse allegations against a once powerful Hollywood producer Harvey Weinstein in 2017 triggered 
similar accusations against many prominent figures and generated widespread public condemnations. 
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violence. Single property ownership may lessen violence against women in advanced countries with 
more efficient and equal institutions. However, this is not necessarily the case in less developed 
countries with traditional male domination and widespread culture of female abuse.     
We are aware of relatively few studies on the link between property ownership and domestic 
violence. Panda and Agarwal (2005) use survey data of 502 women from Kerala, India and find that 
women who own land or house are less likely to be subject to domestic violence than women who do 
not own such property. Bhattacharyya et al. (2011) also show that house ownership by women reduces 
the probability of domestic violence against them using data of 155 households from Uttar Pradesh, 
India. These studies rely on small sample sizes from two states within India. Peterman et al. (2017) use 
data from 28 low- and middle-income countries to investigate the relationship between women’s asset 
ownership and intimate partner violence, and conclude that there was no significant relationship 
between asset ownership (land, house, or both and sole, joint, or both) and violence in most settings. 
Oduro et al. (2015) use nationally representative surveys for Ecuador and Ghana, and find that that 
women’s share of couple wealth (which includes the value of physical and financial assets) lowers odds 
of physical violence in Ecuador and emotional violence in Ghana. Our paper complements these studies 
by drawing on a large data across four countries to show how different types of property ownership by 
women are correlated with the incidences of domestic abuse. 
Our study fits within the literature on the effect of families’ economic well-being on domestic 
violence. Tauchen et al. (1991), using data from California, show that an increase in men’s income 
reduces domestic violence for high-income households. A rise of women’s income lowers domestic 
abuse if men provide most of the family income, but escalates violence if women earn more. The author 
conjectures that the latter result in high-income families might be due to unwillingness of women to 
make transfers to men. For low-income families, the authors did not report a statistically robust effect 
of female income on domestic abuse. Bobonis et al. (2013) provide evidence that women who received 
transfers from Mexican Oportunidades program face a lower risk of physical violence but a higher 
likelihood of violent threats without further abuse. Felson and Messner (2000) find that compared to 
other assaults, assaults against wives are more likely to be driven by husbands’ desire to control the 
behavior of their wives. According to Angelucci (2008), small cash transfers to women reduce domestic 
violence in rural Mexico, whereas larger cash transfers to women increase the wife abuse by husbands 
with traditional gender ideologies. Our finding that sole property ownership does not mitigate, and at 
times even heighten, domestic violence is consistent with these results. Our results highlight the link 
between a type of the wife’s ownership and violence by an intimate partner and suggests that countries 
with different institutional and political settings do not necessarily have to pursue the same patterns of 
reforms to enhance women’s safety and well-being. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the data and methodology 
followed by the analysis of empirical results (Section 3). Section 4 concludes. 
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2. Data and Empirical Design 
We use information on four Latin American (LA) countries from nationally representative surveys 
conducted by Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS), which collects and disseminates representative 
data on numerous dimensions of population, health and nutrition in developing countries. Across all 
surveyed countries, DHS utilizes standardized questionnaires for household, women’s, and men’s 
interviews, and uses multistage, clustered area sampling techniques (see MacQuarrie et al. (2016) for a 
detailed description of the DHS surveys methods). We use the individual woman’s questionnaire dataset 
for the women between ages 15 and 49 years, which includes a variety of information on a woman and 
her husband/partner’s characteristics, on marital status, household possessions, children’s health and 
nutritional status. Our analysis includes only those women who are either currently married or living 
with a partner. These two categories allow us to examine the possible link between property ownership 
type and domestic violence perpetrated by a husband/partner. The data availability varies across-
countries and across-years. We construct a cross-sectional dataset by merging information on the 
following countries (year): Dominican Republic (2013), Guatemala (2014), Honduras (2012), and Haiti 
(2012).2 Compared to the other developing regions in the world, prevalence of consensual 
unions/cohabitations or in partnership relationship is quite rampant in Latin American countries (e.g., 
Deere and Léon 2001; Esteve et al. 2012; Glaser 1999). In our sample, 61.4% of women were married 
and 38.6% were living with their partners without any nuptial agreement. This unique feature, along 
with the necessity of having data on myriad of essential covariates in the model, derives the selection 
of our sample countries.   
 
2.1. Domestic violence 
Our indicators of domestic violence include (1) psychological violence (emotional duress, 
humiliation, threats, and insults) and (2) physical violence (acts of pushing, slapping, punching, kicking, 
strangling or burning). There are some inconsistencies across the choices in the violence-related survey 
questions. For example, the question on emotional duress asks whether the woman experienced any 
emotional violence by husband/partner without reference to time frame or frequency of such act. In our 
sample, 26.9% of women affirmed that faced such violence. However, in the question on ever being 
humiliated by husband/partner, the respondent woman is given five options to choose from: (i) never, 
(ii) often, (iii) sometimes, (iv) yes, but not in the last 12 months, (v) yes, but frequency in last 12 month 
is missing. Therefore, in order to be consistent across all indicators of violence, we have converted the 
answers for each question into a binary variable with one reflecting ever faced abuse, irrespective of its 
frequency, and zero denoting never experienced any abuse by husband/partner. This treatment of 
                                                 
2 Violence against women can take many forms. The 1994 United Nations General Assembly Resolution defined 
such violence as “Any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result in physical, sexual, or 
psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of 
liberty, whether occurring in public or private life.” (United Nations General Assembly 1994) 
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violence variables also helps to minimize self-reported bias in accurately remembering the counts of 
such acts. 
An individual variable only captures a specific act of violence and, therefore, it may not reveal 
the extent of overall violence faced by a woman. Moreover, a woman may face some, but not all, type 
of physical or psychological violence. To account for whether she was subject to any act of 
psychological or physical abuse, we construct two additional dummy variables for the presence of any 
of the four (five) types of psychological (physical) violence. In our sample, 23.8 and 14.1 percent of 
women were subject to psychological and physical violence, respectively. 
 
2.2. Property ownership 
We construct four dummy variables for women’s ownership of property – single house 
ownership, joint house ownership, single land ownership, and joint land ownership – using information 
from DHS surveys. Single (joint) house ownership dummy takes the value of one if she owns a house 
alone (jointly), and zero otherwise. Similarly, single (joint) land ownership variable equals one if she 
owns land alone (jointly). 
In our sample, 11.8 (34.8) percent of women owned a house alone (jointly), while 9 (12.4) 
percent of them owned land alone (jointly), implying that the share of women who co-own a house is 
three times higher than the share of women who co-own a land. Women who own a house along are 
more likely to own a land alone but are less likely to own a land or another house jointly. These 
correlations, however, are not very strong. The correlation between owning a house alone and owning 
a land alone is around 14% for Dominican Republic, Guatemala, and Honduras, and 45% for Haiti. The 
correlation between co-owning a house and co-owning a land is 28% for Dominican Republic and 
Guatemala, 17% for Honduras, and 61% for Haiti. The correlation between having both single and co-
owned house (land) is negative and ranges between -20% (-9%) and -32% (22%). Finally, the 
correlation between co-owning one type of property alone and another type of property jointly is 
negative ranging between -0.1% and -13%. Among the women who experienced psychological 
violence, 12.9 (87.1) percent owned (did not own) a house alone, 32.6 (67.4) percent owned (did not 
own) a house jointly, 9.1 (91) percent owned (did not own) land alone and 10.1 (89.1) percent owned 
(did not own) a land jointly. Similarly, among the women who experienced physical violence, 12.7 
(87.3) percent owned (did not own) a house alone, 31.6 (68.4) percent owned (did not own) a house 
jointly, 9.2 (90.8) percent owned (did not own) land alone and 11.8 (88.2) percent owned (did not own) 
a land jointly. The DHS data does not provide information on the timing of a property ownership, and 
with whom the property is owned jointly. Although we understand that there can be numerous 
possibilities with regard to joint ownership of a property, it is reasonable to assume that the most joint 
ownership can likely be with husband or partner. 
  
2.3. Control variables 
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We account for a myriad of heterogeneous covariates that may influence both the property ownership 
and domestic violence. The choice of control variables is guided by the existing literature on the 
determinants of domestic violence and the availability of information in the utilized DHS dataset.3 In 
particular, both spouses’/partners’ education, employment status, and age are added. We control for 
whether the husband/partner drinks alcohol and whether the woman lives with her husband/partner, 
reads newspaper/magazine, listens to radio, and watches television. We also include joint/household 
information such as household wealth index, number of children, days since last intimacy, and whether 
they live in an urban or rural area. Education variable ranges from zero, indicating no education, to 
three, reflecting tertiary or higher level of education. In our sample, 11.6% (10.1%) of women 
(husbands/partners) have no education. The shares of those with primary, secondary, and tertiary levels 
of education are 52.6% (54.5%), 27.8% (27.9%), and 8.1% (7.6%), respectively. The values of 
employment status or occupation type range from zero to four, with zero referring to not working or 
being unemployed. The values of one to four indicate increasingly higher skilled level of occupation. 
In our sample, minimum (maximum) age of woman is 15 (49), minimum (maximum) age of 
husband/partner is 15 (99), and the number of alive children ranges from zero to 15 with an average of 
2.73 children per couple. The three variables reflecting the level of awareness through media exposure 
– whether reads newspaper/magazine, listens to radio and watches television – range from zero to three 
each, with larger value indicating a higher frequency of these activities (i.e., zero = not at all; one = less 
than once a week; two = at least once a week; and three = almost every day). Household wealth index 
ranges from one to five, with higher value indicative of greater amount of wealth. Days since intimacy 
variable captures the number of days passed since the last time the couple had sex. Its value ranges 
between zero and 31 plus days. Panels A, B and C of Table 1 present summary statistics of domestic 
violence, property ownership, and control variables, respectively. 
 
[Table 1 here] 
 
2.4. Empirical model 
Our estimating model is as follows: 
௜ܸ ൌ ߮଴ ൅ ߮ଵܪ௔,௜ ൅ ߮ଶܪ௝,௜ ൅ ߮ଷܮ௔,௜ ൅ ߮ସܮ௝,௜ ൅෍ߛ௞ܺ௞,௜௄௞ୀଵ ൅ ߟ௖ ൅ ݁௜ (1) 
In equation (1), ݅  refers to the individual female respondent, ܸ  represents whether a woman experienced 
an incidence of violence, ܪ௔(ܪ௝ሻ indicates house ownership alone (jointly),	ܮ௔(ܮ௝ሻ denotes land 
                                                 
3 For example, see Angelucci (2008), Bhattacharyya et al. (2011), Eswaran and Malhorta (2011), Kaukinen and 
Powers (2015), and Panda and Agarwal (2005) for an exhaustive discussion on the interplay between multitude 
of socio-economic factors and domestic violence against women in developing countries.  
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ownership alone (jointly), ଵܺ,௜, … ܺ௄,௜ stand for control variables, ߟ denotes country fixed effects to 
account for country level unobserved factors, and ݁ is the error term. The coefficients ߮ଵ	ݐ݋	߮ସ are 
parameters of main interest. Since the outcome variable is dichotomous, we apply the logit regression 
with robust standard errors to estimate the model. We also estimate equation (1) separately for women 
who are married and those living with partners. Numerous control variables are added to account for 
potential endogeneity issues. Some of the regressors might be potentially bad controls in a sense that 
they are the outcomes of the property ownership variable. Therefore, we check our results running a 
parsimonious regression, which includes only property ownership variables, type of residence (urban 
vs rural), country fixed effects, and then successively add more controls. 
 
3. Results 
We estimate several variants of equation (1) to examine the association between domestic abuse against 
women and the women’s ownership of property. Column (1) of Table 2 shows the relationship between 
psychological violence and property (house and land) ownership, while controlling for the area of 
residence and country fixed effects. In columns (2)-(6), we sequentially enter to our baseline regression 
other control variables to assess the robustness of our key variables of interest. Only domestic violence 
variables are reported to save space; the full results are presented in Appendix A. 
 
[Table 2 here] 
 
Columns (1) and (2) show that house ownership alone (jointly) is positively (negatively) 
associated with psychological violence against women. However, with the addition of other covariates 
in columns (3-6), single house ownership variable becomes statistically insignificant, albeit negative; 
the effect of joint house ownership remains statistically significant and negative in all models. The 
impact of single and joint land ownership is negative in all the regressions, but land ownership alone is 
statistically significant only in two out of six regressions; the impact of joint ownership remains robust 
across all models. The reported Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and the Bayesian Information 
Criterion (BIC) display the lowest values for the regression model in column (6) suggesting that this 
fully specified model is more efficient. We compute the marginal effect of joint house and land 
ownership variables (at the mean) for the model in column (6). Owning a house (land) jointly lowers 
the chance of psychological violence from her husband/partner by 1.7 (1.8) percentage points, while 
the effect is statistically insignificant for the individual house/land ownership. The overall impact of 
violence can be substantial owing to negative externalities to children, parents, and kin of the victims. 
Therefore, joint property ownership by a woman can reduce substantial emotional costs associated with 
domestic violence to families. We also report the odds ratios for joint house and land ownership 
 
 
7
variables in column (6).4 Compared to women who do not own a join property, the odds of facing 
psychological violence from her husband/partner are 9 (10) percent lower if a woman jointly owns a 
house (land). 
With regard to control variables, husband’s (partner) employment status variable is not 
statistically significant. However, it appears that women with high-skilled jobs face more violence. 
Earlier literature has highlighted the possibilities of men using violence to extract rents from their wives 
(e.g., Bobonis et al. 2013). According to Bobonis et al. (2013), men might feel threatened by women’s 
employment status and income “either because these women have an income of their own, or because 
having a job requires diverting time and attention outside the household, or a combination of factors of 
this nature” (p. 184). Empirical evidence on the link between female employment and domestic abuse 
is somewhat mixed; majority of studies show that female employment is associated with more domestic 
violence in developing countries and less domestic violence in developed countries  (Garcia-Moreno 
2000; Eswaran and Malhotra 2011; Kaukinen and Powers 2015).5 In developed countries, where 
domestic violence is relatively costly to undertake, women empowerment can indeed be a protective 
factor, as it would improve female escape options and bargaining power. When domestic abuse is 
common and widely tolerated, successfully employed women would face more abuse by retaliating 
coercive partners. The results of other control variables are largely as expected. 
In Table 3, we report the results for physical violence, which are produced following the 
specifications in Table 2 and present the full results in Appendix A. Again, the impact of a joint house 
ownership is negative and statistically significant across all models, while the effects of all other 
ownership variables including joint land ownership are not statistically significant. The results of 
control variables are broadly similar to those in Table 2. The marginal effect in column (6) shows that 
owning a house jointly by a woman reduces the probability of physical violence perpetrated by her 
husband/partner by 1.4 percentage points. Moreover, the odds of facing physical violence are 12 percent 
lower for women who own a house jointly compared to those who lack such ownership. There is a 
positive correlation between owning a house alone (jointly) and owning a land alone (jointly), although 
the correlations are less than 30% for the full sample. Nevertheless, we estimated single and joint house 
ownership separately from single and joint land ownership. The single house (land) ownership 
coefficients remain statistically insignificant, whereas the effect of joint house ownership is robust. The 
negative effect of joint land ownership is now statistically significant for both psychological and 
physical violence (available upon request). We do not have information on property value. The value 
of property and distribution of ownership differ between urban and rural areas. Therefore, we run 
separate regressions for psychological violence and physical violence for urban and rural subsamples. 
                                                 
4 Full results for odds ratio are available from the authors upon request. 
5 Bowlus and Seitz (2006) use Canadian data and find that even though men are slightly more likely to abuse 
nonworking wives, employment is a deterrent factor as long as it is taken up before the onset of abuse. Anderberg 
 et al. (2015), using the UK’s Annual Population Survey, show that an increase in male unemployment reduces 
domestic violence. However, a rise in female unemployment augments the incidence of intimate partner violence.   
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The results, which are reported in appendix Table A3, generate two important insights. First, the impact 
of joint house ownership on domestic violence is consistently negative and significant for rural 
subsample; property ownership is not a significant factor in reducing violence in urban areas. Second, 
joint land ownership, which was not a robust determinant of violence in combined sample, is now 
negative and a statistically significant predictor of domestic violence in rural areas.   
 
[Table 3 here] 
 
Tables 4 and 5 show results for individual components of psychological abuse (ever humiliated, 
threatened, insulted or emotionally abused), and physical violence (ever pushed, slapped, punched, 
kicked or strangled), respectively. We apply the fully specified regression model (column 6 of Table 
2). Only the results of property ownership variables are reported to save space. In Table 4 (5), joint 
house ownership is negative and significant in all (three of five) regressions, while joint land ownership 
is negative and significant in three of four (four of five) regressions.  This further confirms that joint 
ownership of a house or land can deter abuse. 
  
[Tables 4 and 5 here] 
 
As mentioned in section 3, 61.4% of women in our sample were married and 38.6% were living 
with their partners without any nuptial agreement. Therefore, we divide our sample into those married 
and those living with partners. Tables 6 present results for psychological and physical violence. The 
results for the other indicators of violence are qualitatively similar (available upon request). We show 
the estimates of property ownership only to save space. 
 
[Table 6 here] 
 
Interestingly, joint house ownership is negative and statistically significant only for the married 
women who are tied in the legally binding nuptial agreement, but its effect is insignificant for women 
in partnership relationship.  Only joint land ownership for in-partnership relationship women is negative 
and marginally significant in reducing psychological violence. 
We test multiple parameters of interest in our full specification, which may lead to multiple 
testing issue. To ensure that our finding on joint property ownership is not simply due to chance, we 
implemented randomization inference clustered at the country-level. First, for each respondent, we 
generated a randomized “placebo” dummies for joint ownership of property and land. We used the 
share of respondents in that country’s sample who jointly own a property as the probability that the 
placebo dummy is one. Second, we re-estimated our main specification with these placebo 
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dummies and obtained the placebo t-statistics. Third, we repeated these two steps 500 times and 
computed a non-parametric estimate of p-values. Each p-value is the number of times the placebo 
t-statistic exceeded the actual t-statistic divided by 500. The estimated p-values for joint house 
ownership and joint land ownership are 0.006 and 0.08, respectively. This raises our confidence that 
the results are not due to chance.6  Endogeneity issue may arise in our study from several sources. First, 
some omitted variables might be correlated with both main explanatory variables and dependent 
variables. We include numerous control variables to control for this possible source of endogeneity and 
our robust results are reassuring. Second, women who command more assets may be able to choose 
higher quality partners (husbands) who are less abusive. We do not have a direct measure of quality to 
account for this selection issue. The partner’s education, partner’s employment status, and household 
wealth are used as proxies for partner’s quality; they together with other controls such as woman 
education and employment are expected to control for the partner’s attribute and mitigate this selection 
issue. Finally, domestic violence may affect the intra-household asset allocation decisions, raising 
simultaneity issues. Unfortunately, DHS data does not provide information on the timing of assets 
acquirements to directly account for this concern. Our results should be interpreted with these caveats 
in mind. 
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper we examine the impact of women’s property ownership on her experience of domestic 
abuse using a household-level data for four Latin American countries. 
We find no evidence to suggest that single property ownership by a woman reduces domestic 
violence against her. We find that a joint house ownership is associated with a lower likelihood of 
psychological and physical violence against the woman. The violence-mitigating effect of joint house 
ownership holds for married couples only. The impact of joint land ownership, however, is statistically 
significant for women living in rural areas. Overall, the property ownership appears to be more 
important in reducing domestic violence in rural areas than in urban areas. 
Our results are illuminating, since one would think that compared to income and other material 
means, single property ownership by a woman is much more powerful factor in preventing abuse against 
her as such ownership paves an escape route for the woman. Our findings suggest that policymakers in 
developing countries should not simply rely on women empowerment as a mean to reduce intimate 
partner violence. Reforms to empower women should go hand-in-hand with serious institutional, 
cultural and educational reforms to end the widespread culture of abuse, strengthen cooperation 
between people, and promote zero tolerance to violence and coercion in families.  
  
                                                 
6 We thank the reviewer for suggesting this analysis. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs Mean S.D. Min Max 
Panel A: Types of domestic violence      
index of psychological violence 23,464 0.24 0.43 0 1 
experienced any emotional violence 23,464 0.24 0.43 0 1 
ever humiliated  23,464 0.13 0.33 0 1 
ever threatened  23,464 0.06 0.24 0 1 
ever insulted  23,464 0.21 0.41 0 1 
index of physical violence 23,464 0.14 0.35 0 1 
ever pushed 23,464 0.11 0.32 0 1 
ever slapped  23,464 0.08 0.27 0 1 
ever punched  23,464 0.06 0.24 0 1 
ever kicked  23,464 0.03 0.17 0 1 
ever strangled/burnt  23,464 0.02 0.13 0 1 
Panel B: Property ownership       
own a house alone 23,464 0.12 0.32 0 1 
own house jointly  23,464 0.35 0.48 0 1 
own a land alone  23,464 0.09 0.29 0 1 
own a land jointly 23,464 0.12 0.33 0 1 
Panel C: Control variables      
household wealth index 23,464 2.77 1.39 1 5 
education 23,464 1.32 0.78 0 3 
husband/partner's education 23,464 1.33 0.76 0 3 
age 23,464 31.69 8.46 15 49 
husband/partner's age 23,464 36.71 10.41 15 99 
number of children 23,464 2.73 1.97 0 15 
husband/partner drinks 23,464 0.39 0.49 0 1 
days since intimacy  23,464 9.78 10.60 0 31 
living with husband/partner  23,464 0.87 0.34 0 1 
reads newspaper/magazine 23,464 0.66 0.87 0 3 
listens radio 23,464 1.56 0.92 0 3 
watches television  23,464 1.28 0.96 0 3 
employment  23,464 0.99 1.30 0 4 
husband/partner's employment  23,464 1.81 1.19 0 4 
Urban 23,464 0.43 0.50 0 1 
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Table 2: Psychological violence  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
owns a house alone 0.101** 0.103** 0.06 0.07 0.067 0.057 
 (0.050) (0.050) (0.051) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) 
owns a house jointly -0.062* -0.070* -0.115*** -0.101*** -0.098** -0.095**  
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.038) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) 
[Marginal effect]      
-0.017** 
      (0.007) 
[Odds ratio]      
 0.909** 
      (0.035) 
owns land alone -0.012 -0.009 -0.002 -0.01 -0.007 -0.02 
 (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) 
owns land jointly -0.063 -0.066 -0.079 -0.094* -0.09 -0.104*   
 (0.053) (0.053) (0.054) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) 
[Marginal effect]      
-0.018* 
      (0.010) 
[Odds ratio]      
 0.901* 
      (0.049) 
No. of controls added 1 2 7        10 13 15 (all) 
country fixed-effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 23464 23464 23464 23464 23464 23464 
AIC 25596.9 25559.5 25442.3 24889.4 24875.8 24835.2 
BIC 25669.5 25640.2 25563.2 25034.5 25045.2 25020.6 
Notes: All models use logit regressions with robust standard errors presented in brackets. ***, **, and * represent  
significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels. N stands for the number of observations; AIC for Akaike Information  
Criterion and BIC for Bayesian Information Criterion. Column (1) to (6) gradually add all the control variables including 
household hold wealth index, education of women, education of husband/partner, number of children, whether 
husband/partner drinks, days since intimacy, living with husband/partner, reads newspaper/magazine, listens radio, watches 
television, employment status of women, employment status of husband/partner, and residence type. 
 
 
Table 3: Physical violence 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
owns a house alone 0.039 0.042 0.03 0.04 0.035 0.024 
 (0.061) (0.061) (0.063) (0.064) (0.064) (0.064) 
owns a house jointly -0.125*** -0.137*** -0.152*** -0.133*** -0.132*** -0.129*** 
 (0.045) (0.045) (0.047) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) 
[Marginal effect]      
-0.014*** 
      (0.005) 
[Odds ratio]      
  0.879*** 
      (0.420) 
owns land alone -0.013 -0.009 0.015 0.003 0.008 -0.007 
 (0.068) (0.068) (0.069) (0.070) (0.070) (0.070) 
owns land jointly -0.052 -0.056 -0.066 -0.082 -0.075 -0.093 
 (0.065) (0.066) (0.066) (0.067) (0.067) (0.067) 
No. of controls added 1 2 7        10 13 15 (all) 
country fixed-effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 23464 23464 23464 23464 23464 23464 
AIC 19046 18991.1 18852.9 18378.2 18353.9 18315.9 
BIC 19118.6 19071.8 18973.8 18523.4 18523.2 18501.4 
Note: Same as for Table 2. 
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Table 4: Individual indicators of psychological violence 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variables → ever ever ever emotional 
 humiliated threatened insulted violence 
owns a house alone 0.074 0.166* 0.04 0.057 
 (0.066) (0.085) (0.054) (0.052) 
owns a house jointly -0.123** -0.139** -0.094** -0.095**  
 (0.050) (0.069) (0.041) (0.039) 
owns land alone -0.073 0.06 -0.027 -0.02 
 (0.074) (0.095) (0.060) (0.057) 
owns land jointly -0.203*** -0.219** -0.071 -0.104*   
 (0.071) (0.101) (0.057) (0.055) 
all control variables included Y Y Y Y 
country fixed-effects Y Y Y Y 
N 23464 23464 23464 23464 
AIC 17145.8 10511.5 23379.3 24835.2 
BIC 17331.2 10697 23564.8 25020.6 
Notes: All of these models include control variables of a fully specified model as in column (6)  
of Table 2.  All other notes are same as for Table 2. 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Individual indicators of physical violence 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 ever ever ever  ever ever 
 pushed  slapped punched kicked strangled  
owns a house alone 0.036 0.067 -0.057 -0.047 0.023 
 (0.068) (0.082) (0.093) (0.127) (0.164) 
owns a house jointly -0.220*** -0.046 -0.079 -0.188* -0.274**  
 (0.052) (0.062) (0.070) (0.099) (0.133) 
owns land alone 0.000 -0.068 0.008 -0.163 0.233 
 (0.075) (0.092) (0.099) (0.141) (0.172) 
owns land jointly -0.067 -0.149* -0.271*** -0.277** -0.380*   
 (0.074) (0.086) (0.100) (0.137) (0.200) 
all control variables 
included 
Y Y Y Y Y 
country fixed-effects Y Y Y Y Y 
N 23464 23464 23464 23464 23464 
AIC 16046.7 12295.1 10287.2 6086.6 3828.2 
BIC 16232.1 12480.6 10472.7 6272 4013.7 
Notes: All of these models include control variables of a fully specified model as in column (6) of Table 3.   
All other notes are same as for Table 3. 
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Table 6: Impact for married couple versus those for partners 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Married  Married  Partner Partner 
 Psychological  Physical  Psychological Physical  
 violence  violence violence  violence 
owns a house alone 0.048 0.014 0.065 0.024 
 (0.074) (0.092) (0.074) (0.089) 
owns a house jointly -0.122** -0.178*** -0.032 -0.051 
 (0.055) (0.067) (0.057) (0.069) 
owns land alone 0.009 -0.082 -0.048 0.105 
 (0.075) (0.094) (0.091) (0.106) 
owns land jointly -0.051 -0.06 -0.175* -0.106 
 (0.069) (0.084) (0.097) (0.118) 
all control variables included Y Y Y Y 
country fixed-effects Y Y Y Y 
N 12993 12993 10471 10471 
AIC 12947.2 9531.7 11881.7 8793.8 
BIC 13119.1 9703.6 12041.3 8953.4 
Notes: Columns (1) and (3) include control variables of a fully specified model as in column (6) of Table 2,  
and columns (2) and (4) include control variables of a fully specified model as in column (6) of Table 3. All  
other notes are same as for Table 2. 
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Appendix A 
 
Table A1: Psychological violence – full results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
owns a house alone 0.101** 0.103** 0.06 0.07 0.067 0.057 
 (0.050) (0.050) (0.051) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) 
owns a house jointly -0.062* -0.070* -0.115*** -0.101*** -0.098** -0.095**  
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.038) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) 
[Marginal effect]      
-0.017** 
      (0.007) 
[Odds ratio]      
 0.909** 
      (0.035) 
owns land alone -0.012 -0.009 -0.002 -0.01 -0.007 -0.02 
 (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) 
owns land jointly -0.063 -0.066 -0.079 -0.094* -0.09 -0.104*   
 (0.053) (0.053) (0.054) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) 
[Marginal effect]      
-0.018* 
      (0.010) 
[Odds ratio]      
 0.901* 
      (0.049) 
household wealth index  -0.086*** -0.013 -0.016 -0.037** -0.048*** 
  (0.014) (0.016) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) 
education   -0.049* -0.060** -0.053* -0.081*** 
   (0.028) (0.028) (0.029) (0.029) 
husband/partner's education   -0.076*** -0.080*** -0.077*** -0.083*** 
   (0.027) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) 
age   -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.014*** 
   (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
husband/partner's age   0.002 0.003 0.004 0.004*   
   (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
number of children   0.097*** 0.090*** 0.091*** 0.093*** 
   (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
husband/partner drinks    0.757*** 0.755*** 0.752*** 
    (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) 
days since intimacy      0.000 0.000 0.000 
    (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
living with husband/partner     0.165*** 0.168*** 0.172*** 
    (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) 
reads newspaper/magazine     -0.024 -0.032 
     (0.021) (0.021) 
listens radio     -0.037** -0.034*   
     (0.018) (0.018) 
watches television     0.084*** 0.087*** 
     (0.021) (0.021) 
employment       0.084*** 
      (0.013) 
husband/partner's employment       0.012 
      (0.015) 
urban 0.216*** 0.356*** 0.370*** 0.356*** 0.339*** 0.324*** 
 (0.033) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) 
constant -1.281*** -1.149*** -1.027*** -1.715*** -1.752*** -1.729*** 
 (0.047) (0.051) (0.089) (0.110) (0.113) (0.114) 
country fixed-effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 23464 23464 23464 23464 23464 23464 
AIC 25596.9 25559.5 25442.3 24889.4 24875.8 24835.2 
BIC 25669.5 25640.2 25563.2 25034.5 25045.2 25020.6 
Notes: All models use logit regressions with robust standard errors presented in brackets. ***, **, and * represent  
significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels. N stands for the number of observations; AIC for Akaike Information  
Criterion and BIC for Bayesian Information Criterion. 
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Table A2: Physical violence – full results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
owns a house alone 0.039 0.042 0.03 0.04 0.035 0.024 
 (0.061) (0.061) (0.063) (0.064) (0.064) (0.064) 
owns a house jointly -0.125*** -0.137*** -0.152*** -0.133*** -0.132*** -0.129*** 
 (0.045) (0.045) (0.047) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) 
[Marginal effect]      
-0.014*** 
      (0.005) 
[Odds ratio]      
  0.879*** 
      (0.420) 
owns land alone -0.013 -0.009 0.015 0.003 0.008 -0.007 
 (0.068) (0.068) (0.069) (0.070) (0.070) (0.070) 
owns land jointly -0.052 -0.056 -0.066 -0.082 -0.075 -0.093 
 (0.065) (0.066) (0.066) (0.067) (0.067) (0.067) 
household wealth index  -0.127*** -0.02 -0.025 -0.062*** -0.073*** 
  (0.017) (0.020) (0.020) (0.022) (0.022) 
education   -0.124*** -0.140*** -0.134*** -0.163*** 
   (0.034) (0.035) (0.036) (0.036) 
husband/partner's education  -0.054 -0.059* -0.057* -0.060*   
   (0.033) (0.034) (0.034) (0.035) 
age   -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.015*** -0.018*** 
   (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
husband/partner's age   -0.008*** -0.006** -0.006** -0.006*   
   (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
number of children   0.126*** 0.119*** 0.123*** 0.125*** 
   (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
husband/partner drinks    0.855*** 0.850*** 0.846*** 
    (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) 
days since intimacy    -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
    (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
living with husband/partner    0.112* 0.117* 0.120*   
    (0.066) (0.066) (0.066) 
reads newspaper/magazine    -0.035 -0.045*   
     (0.026) (0.026) 
listens radio     -0.016 -0.013 
     (0.021) (0.021) 
watches television     0.139*** 0.143*** 
     (0.026) (0.026) 
employment       0.101*** 
      (0.015) 
husband/partner's employment      0.001 
      (0.019) 
urban 0.161*** 0.369*** 0.381*** 0.363*** 0.335*** 0.317*** 
 (0.040) (0.050) (0.050) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) 
constant -1.968*** -1.779*** -1.258*** -1.963*** -2.075*** -2.040*** 
 (0.058) (0.063) (0.112) (0.137) (0.140) (0.141) 
country fixed-effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 23464 23464 23464 23464 23464 23464 
AIC 19046 18991.1 18852.9 18378.2 18353.9 18315.9 
BIC 19118.6 19071.8 18973.8 18523.4 18523.2 18501.4 
Note: Same as for Table A1. 
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Table A3: Separate analysis for urban and rural subsamples 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Psychological  Psychological  Physical  Physical  
 violence  violence  violence  violence 
  urban area rural area urban area rural area 
owns a house alone 0.08 0.033 0.085 -0.01 
 (0.078) (0.071) (0.094) (0.088) 
owns a house jointly 0.022 -0.157*** -0.124 -0.128** 
 (0.061) (0.051) (0.076) (0.062) 
owns land alone -0.08 0.001 -0.02 -0.001 
 (0.092) (0.074) (0.112) (0.091) 
owns land jointly -0.046 -0.119* 0.128 -0.182** 
 (0.094) (0.069) (0.111) (0.085) 
all control variables included Y Y Y Y 
country fixed-effects Y Y Y Y 
N 10128 13336 10128 13336 
AIC 11211.2 13582.4 8251.2 10055.4 
BIC 11370.1 13747.3 8410.1 10220.3 
Notes: All of these models include control variables of a fully specified model as in column (6) of Table 3.   
All other notes are same as for Table 3. 
